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External Shocks and Business Cycle Fluctuations in Oil-exporting Small Open Economies: The 
Case of Nigeria 
Sunday Oladunni* 
Abstract 
This study employs a sign-restricted Bayesian structural vector autoregressive (BSVAR) model to 
analyse how global demand, oil price and the US monetary policy shocks impact the Nigerian business 
cycle. The objective is to uncover the dominant external drivers of the business cycle in Nigeria. Results 
show that global demand and oil price shocks are the principal foreign drivers of the Nigerian business 
cycle. The global demand shock elicits the strongest responses from output growth and inflation; while 
oil price shock impacts the terms-of-trade and interest rate the most. The historical contributions of 
the global demand and oil price shocks to the evolution of output growth are significant and 
comparable, while that of oil price shock to inflation and interest rate is dominant. Further sensitivity 
analysis of pre-crisis period of 2008/09 suggests that macroeconomic risk arising from global demand 
shock is systematic, owing to the comparable impact on output growth and similar interest rate 
response in the two estimations. Evidence suggests that the GFC may have contributed to the more 
volatile inflation response to global demand shock in our full sample estimation. Given the strong and 
pervasive impact of the global demand shock on output growth, Nigeria can manage its vulnerability 
by shrinking the size of oil exports in its terms-of-trade, while growing non-oil exports progressively 
through sustained economic diversification and viable industrialisation strategy. 
 Keywords: External Shocks, Sign Restrictions, Bayesian SVAR, Business Cycle Fluctuation 
JEL Classifications: F44, E37, C11, E32 
 
1.0 Introduction 
The role played by external shocks in the evolution of countries business cycles is recognized in the 
literature. However, empirical questions still abound in oil-exporting small open economies (SOEs) 
on the relative contributions of specific external shocks to the business cycle process. Each foreign 
shock affect countries in different ways, depending on the extent of each country’s vulnerability, size 
of the shock and the active channels of transmission for the shock. A clear understanding of the strands 
of external shocks driving the business cycle is crucial for the formulation and implementation of 
appropriate macroeconomic policy responses. The knowledge of key business cycle-perturbing 
external shocks is particularly of interest to policy makers in oil-exporting small open economies, 
including Nigeria, in view of the important roles of oil exports in those economies. This argument is 
buttressed by the submission of Cashin & Sosa (2013), that an accurate identification and evaluation 
of sources of foreign disturbances and the mechanisms for adjusting to them is important for 
understanding business cycles dynamics and for designing appropriate policies to manage them. In 
other words, the extent of a country’s vulnerability to external shocks determine the choice, intensity 
and sequence of policy responses to such a shock. 
Extant literature on Nigeria focuses overwhelmingly on the identification of individual foreign shocks, 
with huge concentration on oil price shock. For instance, Olomola & Adejumo (2006), Omisakin 
(2008), Umar & Kilishi (2010) and Ekong & Effiong (2015); amongst many others, zeroed in on oil 
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price shock in their studies. The emphasis on oil-related shocks tend to obscure other potentially 
important external shocks to which the Nigerian economy may be susceptible. Thus, resulting in 
inaccurate inferences and inappropriate policy prescriptions.  In order to address this, we adopt a 
unified approach achieved through block identification of three external shocks, namely: global 
demand, oil price and US monetary policy shocks. This modelling approach is particularly useful for 
disentangling the different external shock components affecting domestic business cycle movement.  
Through this approach, we can uncover the impact of each external shock and the corresponding 
relative contribution of each shock, over time, to the Nigerian business cycle. 
This paper aims to investigate the relative contributions of the three external shocks in the evolution 
of the Nigerian business cycle using sign-restricted Bayesian structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) 
modelling technique. To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to apply this methodology on the 
Nigerian data to analyse a subject that has received limited attention in the oil-exporting small open 
economy literature. The paper, therefore, represents an important addition to the applied 
macroeconomic literature in Nigeria and the wider oil-exporting developing and emerging economies. 
The sign restriction identification procedure derives from Olayeni (2009a), Adebiyi & Mordi (2012) 
and Allegret & Benkhodja (2015), in addition to the global macroeconomic literature in the spirit of 
Mumtaz & Surico (2009) and Kilian & Lewis (2011). 
The results show that global demand shocks tend to impact domestic output growth positively for a 
long time. Similarly, domestic inflation exhibits high sensitivity to the global demand shock, while 
monetary policy tightens over longer horizon in response to the global demand shock-induced 
inflationary pressure. The sharp but short-lived response of terms-of-trade to the global demand shock 
stems directly from the positive response of oil price to the same shock, given the close link between 
the two variables in Nigeria. It is apparent from our results, that any shock that moves the oil price 
upward will elicit similar effect on the terms-of-trade, as oil exports constitute a major component of 
the terms-of-trade. There is a delayed positive domestic inflation response to the US monetary policy 
shock, suggesting that monetary tightening in the US can elicits inflationary consequences in SOEs. 
This can be attributed to the effects of capital reversal arising from increased returns on financial assets 
in the US and the consequent flight to safety and quality. The lag in inflation response, however, may 
reflect investors cautious attitude or potential temporary constraints to capital mobility. 
In addition, the US monetary policy shock exerts a moderate and negative effect on the domestic output 
growth in our model; indicating that monetary policy actions in the rest of the world do matter for 
macroeconomic stabilisation in Nigeria. The oil price shock does not cause inflation on impact; rather, 
it contributes to inflationary momentum over time. This result captures how oil boom often results to 
immediate improvement in external reserves position and exchange rate appreciation. However, with 
time, the boom induces decline in competitiveness, higher demand for imported goods and excess 
domestic liquidity which often fuel exchange rate and inflationary pressures, that may compel the 
central bank to tighten policy stance. Overall, the global demand and oil price shocks are revealed to 
exert significant influence on domestic output growth and the most discernible effect on inflation 
compared to the US monetary policy shock. The result shows that the global demand shock is the 
prime mover of business cycle fluctuations in Nigeria. Our robustness exercise in which the model 
was re-estimated for the pre-GFC period show that, whereas global demand shock had similar effects 
on domestic output growth and interest rate, its effects on inflation volatility moderated significantly 
in the pre-crisis period. This indicates that the global financial crisis (GFC) amplified inflation 
volatility in response to the global demand shock. 
 3 
Section 2 summarise stylized facts on the variables and section 3 presents a survey of the literature. 
Section 4 explores the methodology while section 5 treats the model, identification strategy and 
estimation. Section 6 presents and discusses the results while section 7 concludes the paper. 
2.0 Stylized Facts 
To provide some preliminary insights on relevant sets of external and domestic variables in the paper, 
we show three charts which pair each external variable with two most important domestic business 
cycle variables, as well as the descriptive statistics of the data. Figure 1 below, shows movement in 
the quarterly world output growth, domestic output growth and domestic inflation rates between 
2001Q1 and 2016Q1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: World Output Growth, Domestic Growth and Inflation Rates 
Over the period, world output growth had been positive and fairly stable around an average of 3.0 
percent. The worst performance for global growth was experienced late 2009 at 0.34 percent. This is 
due to the impact of the global financial crisis of 2008/09 which resulted from a world-wide credit 
crunch. It is observed that, the GFC-induced low global growth did not affect Nigeria's growth 
performance immediately. The effect, however, became manifest after a three-quarter lag; suggesting 
that spill-over effect may be stronger than contagion effect in Nigeria. This may also justify the 
possibility of the trade channel being stronger than the financial channel in Nigeria. Domestic inflation 
rate is high and mostly in the double-digit range over the period. Domestic output and inflation are 
shown to move in nearly opposite direction. A classic example of this is between 2015Q1 and 2016Q1 
when domestic output growth and inflation moved in sharply opposite directions; with output 
decelerating into negative territory as inflation skyrocketed. This is a clear case of stagflation, a 
challenge that has remained daunting for policymakers in many oil-exporting emerging economies. 
Figure 2 shows trends in oil price, domestic growth and inflation between 2001Q1 and 2016Q1. The 
chart suggest that oil price and inflation are more volatile and tend to co-move on the average. 
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Figure 2: Oil Price, Domestic Growth and Inflation Rates 
Domestic output growth assumes a unique and less volatile trend; and does not share strong co-
movement with the oil price. However, both oil price and domestic growth exhibit strong co-movement 
between 2014Q3 and 2016Q1. The observed co-movement between oil price and domestic growth is 
asymmetric; as it is more visible when oil price is on a downward path. This trend, when linked with 
the observed rising inflation during the period, tend to suggest that fall in oil price is stag-flationary in 
Nigeria. 
Figure 3 below, shows movement in the US federal funds rate, domestic output growth and inflation. 
Overall, this chart does not indicate significant patterns between federal funds rate and domestic 
variables. However, there is a slight indication that Nigeria's output performance is somewhat 
improved as foreign interest rate falls. This observation is buttressed by the recent trend whereby low 
interest rate environment in developed economies encourages capital flows into emerging market 
economies with high interest rates. An emerging economy with high inflow of foreign capital can 
leverage such inflows to achieve economic growth. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: US Federal Funds, Domestic Inflation and Growth Rates 
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Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the data. GOG is global output growth, FFR is US federal 
funds rate, OPG is oil price growth (Bonny Light Oil price changes), DOG is domestic output growth, 
INF is domestic inflation, TOT is terms-of-trade and DIR is domestic interest rate. 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
  GOG FFR OPG DOG INF TOT DIR 
Mean 3.509 4.358 1.159 4.605 21.03 0.012 11.97 
Median 3.476 4.838 1.081 5.003 13.28 -0.489 11.72 
Maximum 6.226 14.51 65.82 15.18 89.56 33.89 27 
Minimum 0.338 0.073 -50.56 -8.061 -4.976 -31.66 4.63 
Std. Dev. 1.281 3.252 14.87 4.48 19.66 8.233 4.306 
Skewness 0.052 0.292 0.171 -0.332 1.43 0.393 0.979 
Kurtosis 2.761 2.404 5.943 3.482 4.195 7.124 4.103 
Jarque-Bera 0.384 3.953 49.75 3.824 54.48 99.91 28.64 
Probability 0.825 0.138 0 0.147 0 0 0 
Sum 477.2 592.7 157.7 626 2860 1.705 1628 
SS.Dev. 221.5 1428 29877 2709 52206 9151 2503 
 
The table indicates that the distribution of four out of the seven variables satisfy the normality 
assumption while three did not. Compared to foreign variables, the average values and the volatility 
of domestic variables such as DOG and DIR are much higher than their foreign counterparts (i.e. GOG 
and DIR, respectively). Oil price growth and inflation exhibit the highest level of volatility in the 
dataset, a development that aligns with the general characteristics of macroeconomic variables in oil-
exporting small open emerging and developing economies.  
3.0 Literature Review 
The literature provides evidence on the effects of external shocks on oil and non-oil-exporting small 
open economies. While many studies find external shocks to be the major divers of business cycle 
fluctuations, others assign a less significant role to external shocks in the evolution business cycle 
variables. In the case of Australia, Dungey et al. (2002), following results from a SVAR estimation, 
attributes only 32 percent of the variations in output forecast errors over a twelve-month horizon to 
external shocks and show that domestic demand shocks are dominant. Contrary to Dungey et al. 
(2002), given results from an estimated New Keynesian DSGE model, Nimark (2007) submits that 
external shocks explain more than half of the variance in output while domestic demand shocks 
account for just 8.0 per cent. 
Sariola (2015) investigates the structural shocks driving the Swedish business cycle, using a sign-
restricted SVAR, identifies four shocks based on theoretical underpinnings from Riksbank’s Ramses 
II DSGE model by Adolfson & Walentin (2013). The results indicate that nearly half of the volatility 
in the Swedish output is accounted for by productivity and external demand shocks; while the 
contribution of domestic demand shock to output volatility is negligible. The notion that external 
shocks do impact considerably on emerging and developing economies is further strengthened by 
Calvo et al. (1993), who applied a SVAR model and finds that foreign shocks account for a significant 
share of the variance in the real exchange rate in the period 1988 – 1991 in Latin America. Broda & 
Tille (2003) in a study covering seventy-five developing countries across Asia, Africa, Latin America 
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and Eastern Europe, investigated how terms-of-trade can affect a country’s real income, price level 
and exchange rate, using the VAR methodology. They find that a large proportion of the output 
volatilities in developing countries can be attributed to changes in the terms-of-trade. 
Huang & Guo (2006) identified a global supply shock in a SVAR model using data over the period 
1970 - 2002 and finds external innovations to be significant. Ng (2002), in a study of five emerging 
countries in South Eastern Asia, spanning 1970 - 1995, identified one external shock and two domestic 
shocks using a SVAR. The study indicates that the response of domestic variables to external shocks 
across these countries is strong, thus, providing an empirical justification for the establishment of a 
monetary union in the region. Similarly, Genberg (2005) estimated a VAR model to investigate the 
effects of external shocks on East Asian economies and finds that foreign shocks from the US, rather 
than China, mainly account for the inflation dynamics in the six ’Asian Tigers’ economies of Hong 
Kong, Thailand, Singapore, Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines. In a related study on emerging market 
countries over the period 1986M1 - 2000M12, Mackowiak (2007) used world commodity prices, the 
US Federal funds rate, the US aggregate price level, the US money stock and the US aggregate output 
as external shocks. Results from the study suggest that all external shocks apart from the US monetary 
policy shock affect domestic variables significantly in these economies. In addition, the study 
underscores the tendency for external shocks to be persistent, as they are shown to contribute more to 
fluctuations in emerging economies’ domestic variables at longer forecast horizons.  
Sato et al. (2011) examined the contributions of external shocks to fluctuations in East Asian countries’ 
business cycles, with a SVAR model that applied block exogeneity to achieve identification in line 
with the small open economy assumptions. Estimation is conducted for three sub-samples: 1978Q1-
1987Q4; 1988Q1-1996Q4; and 1999Q1-2007Q4 to detect dynamics inherent in each episode of 
external shocks, as well as the business cycle dynamics of East Asian countries. Findings from the 
study indicate that external shocks from the US and Japanese were prominent in East Asian countries 
prior to the GFC. After the crisis, however, while the US shocks still dominated as the main source of 
fluctuations in rest of East Asia, China’s main vulnerability had been to Japanese shocks. Utlaut & 
Van Roye (2010) analysed the effects of external shocks on Asia’s emerging economies through 
Bayesian VAR estimation and showed that nearly half of the drivers of emerging Asia’s real GDP 
growth rate is attributable to external innovations. They simulated a double dip situation in the global 
economy, with a subdued growth path in China based on conditional forecasts, it was discovered that 
the global economic growth trajectory dictates significantly emerging Asia’s economic outlook and 
not the Chinese business cycle fluctuations. 
Silva (2012) examined the role domestic and external shocks play in driving business cycles in Mexico 
and Brazil. A non-recursive contemporaneous and block recursive restrictions were imposed and the 
model was estimated using Bayesian procedure. Results show that the US output shock, compared to 
the US monetary policy shock, exerts greater influence on domestic output volatility. The result also 
shows that, while commodity price shocks account for nearly 18 per cent of the output volatility in a 
2-year horizon in Brazil, it accounts for about 20 percent in Mexico in the same time horizon. Houssa 
et al. (2015) used a mix of sign and recursive restrictions in a Bayesian VAR modelling framework to 
examine the role international and domestic shocks play in shaping the business cycle processes in 
Ghana and South Africa. Their results indicate that world productivity and credit shocks dominate 
more in South Africa than in Ghana, while commodity shocks impact immensely on both countries 
business cycles. Global credit market shocks had no effect on Ghana while productivity shock did, 
suggesting that Ghana’s integration with the global economy works more via trade channels and less 
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via financial channels. Their findings underscore the need to recognize the role of the primary goods 
sector for policy purposes in commodity-exporting countries. 
Rafiq (2011) assumes a small open economy condition to investigate sources of economic fluctuations 
in oil-exporting countries and their implications for the choice of exchange rate regime using a sign-
restricted SVAR. Shocks were identified based on “textbook economic theory” and the results indicate 
that the terms-of-trade shocks impact the exchange rate and domestic price movements more than 
domestic shocks in oil-exporting emerging market economies. A robustness exercise in which the 
terms-of-trade variable is replaced with oil price yielded similar results, except that oil price shock is 
shown to exert greater influence on the exchange rate. In addition, results of the robustness exercise 
also suggest that most of the volatility in the terms-of-trade in emerging market oil-exporting 
economies are due to oil price changes. 
Olomola & Adejumo (2006) examined the effects of oil price shocks on inflation, output, the real 
exchange rate and money supply in Nigeria using standard VAR and finds that oil price shocks’ direct 
effects on inflation and output are muted. Whereas, inflation is influenced by output and the real 
exchange rate shocks, oil price shocks impact significantly on the real exchange rate. The results also 
reveal that oil price shocks pass-through in Nigeria operate via the real exchange rate and money 
supply, respectively. Philip & Akintoye (2006), Christopher & Benedikt (2006) and Omisakin (2008) 
are unanimous in their conclusions that oil price shock has no significant effect on domestic variables. 
However, Umar & Kilishi (2010) using a VAR methodology finds that oil price has significant effects 
on real output, unemployment and money supply, while the effect is not found to be significant for the 
consumer price index. Similarly, Akpan (2009) reports that exchange rate, inflation and output exhibit 
significant sensitivity to oil price movement in Nigeria. Alege (2015) characterize the Nigerian 
business cycle using a DSGE model in the spirits of Nason & Cogley (1994) and Schorfheide (2000); 
extended to incorporate the export sector with a view to reflecting the transmission mechanism of 
terms-of-trade. Results from the study show that the Nigerian business cycle is driven by both real and 
nominal shocks. 
Extant literature suggests that the effects of external shocks as observed with small open economies in 
Asia, Latin America, Middle East and Africa are not the same with the G-7 countries. For instance, 
Kim (2001) finds that the spill-over effect of US monetary policy shocks to the G-7† countries is not 
significant. This result provides some degree of corroboration for subsequent findings by Mackowiak 
(2007), which suggests that the emerging market economies tend to exhibit greater susceptibility to 
external shocks compared to advanced economies. More recently, Huh & Kwon (2015) estimate a 
Bayesian SVAR model of the real exchange rate, output and trade balance for the G-7 with a set of 
sign restrictions derived from Clarida & Gali (1994)’s stochastic rational expectations open-economy 
model with sticky prices. They extend the model by incorporating trade balance and identifying supply 
shocks using the implied long-run restrictions of the output-neutrality condition. Their results show 
that nominal shocks tend to induce real exchange rate depreciation, leading to improvements in the 
trade balance in the long run across the G-7 economies. 
4.0 Methodology, Model and Estimation 
4.1 Methodology 
 
† The G-7 is the group of seven leading advanced economies in the world including the U.S., Canada, France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan and the U.K. 
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Generally, VAR models are known to forecast and describe dependencies among variables well. Since 
Sims (1980) popularization of this class of models, they have become increasingly useful for applied 
macroeconomic and policy analysis (Christiano et al., 1998; Canova, 2005 and Lütkepohl, 2012).  
A VAR(𝑝) process is of the form: 
     𝑦𝑡 = 𝐴𝑖𝑦𝑡−𝑖 + 𝑒𝑡                 (1)  
where 𝑦𝑡 is (𝑁𝑥1) vector of endogenous variables in the model; 𝐴𝑖 is (𝑁𝑥𝑁) matrix of coefficients, 
for 𝑖 = 1,2, . . , 𝑝; and, 𝑒𝑡 represents (𝑁𝑥1) vector of unobservable white noise processes with 𝐸(𝑒𝑡) =0, constant and positive-definite covariance matrix 𝐸(𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑡′) = 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑒𝑡) = 𝛺𝑒 . The errors (𝑒𝑡) have 
zero autocorrelation but may be correlated across equations. This possibility of cross equations 
correlation tends to undermine the plausibility of extracting valid economic intuitions from the 
reduced-form VAR models. Typical VAR models are purely statistical. Therefore, to make meaningful 
economic and policy inferences from any VAR estimates, plausible economic structures are normally 
imposed on the unrestricted VAR system. The structural equivalent of (1) is of the form: 
    𝐵0𝑦𝑡 = 𝐵𝑖𝑦𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜖𝑡               (2) 
where matrix 𝐵0  is the contemporaneous impact matrix, which summarizes the instantaneous 
interactions among the variables; 𝐵i is (𝑁𝑥𝑁)  matrix of coefficients of the model dynamics. The first 
feature which distinguishes the structural VAR from the unrestricted VAR is the addition of the impact 
matrix 𝐵0 , and the second, is the replacement of the reduced-form errors or residuals, 𝑒𝑡  by an (𝑁𝑥1) vector of structural shocks or unobservable zero mean white noise processes, 𝜖𝑡. This property 
ensures that 𝜖𝑡  are serially uncorrelated and independent of each other such that the variance 
covariance matrix 𝛺𝜖 is normalized to 𝐼.  
In order to ensure that shocks 𝜖𝑡 are truly structural and different from the reduced-form residuals, 𝑒𝑡, 
they must be orthogonalized. Identification may be achieved through exclusion restrictions, 
proportionality restrictions or other equality restrictions (Lütkepohl, 2012; Kilian, 2013; Bjornland & 
Thorsrud, 2015). Using sign restriction, Faust (1998), Canova & De Nicolo (2002) and Uhlig (2005) 
achieved identification by restricting the sign (and/or shape) of structural responses. They identify a 
set of impulse responses which agrees with theory-based sign expectations. Unlike the recursive and 
non-recursive techniques which are subject to criticisms largely due to the scepticism about the validity 
of the identifying restrictions employed in them, the sign-restricted SVAR has a strong theoretical 
focus, given that applicable a priori expectations are usually extracted from the outputs of relevant 
theoretical models. Canova (2007), Mountford & Uhlig (2009) and Pappa (2009) applied sign 
restrictions to analyse fiscal shocks, Dedola & Neri (2007) used it to study the effects of technology 
shocks, Canova & De Nicolo (2002) and Scholl & Uhlig (2008) for open economy shocks and Kilian 
& Murphy (2012), Baumeister & Peersman (2013) considered oil markets applications, while Fujita 
(2011) modelled labour market dynamics with it. The procedure for implementing sign restrictions are 
as in Fernandez-Villaverde & Rubio-Ramirez (2010), Kilian (2013) and Sariola (2015). 
4.2 Model 
We identify a block 𝜖𝑡𝑓 of three external shocks assumed to drive both foreign and domestic business 
cycle variables. Vector 𝑦𝑡 in (2) is constructed as follows: 
     [𝑓𝑡𝑑𝑡] = 𝛼𝑥𝑡 + ∑ 𝐴𝑖p𝑖=1 [𝑓𝑡−𝑖𝑑𝑡−𝑖] + 𝐵0−1  [𝜖𝑡𝑓𝜖𝑡𝑑]   (3) 
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where 𝑦𝑡 = [𝑓𝑡𝑑𝑡] ; 𝑓𝑡and𝑑𝑡represent the vectors of foreign and domestic variables, respectively; 𝑥𝑡is 
the vector of exogenous variables and 𝐵0−1 is the impact matrix of contemporaneous effects of the 
mutually uncorrelated foreign shocks vector in the system. The modelling framework for the small 
open economy assumption requires that matrix 𝐴𝑖 is the lower triangular matrix which does not allow 
the lagged values of domestic variables to affect those in the foreign block. The 𝐵0−1 matrix also, in 
line with Karagedikli & Price (2012) would be restricted to a lower triangular matrix in order to capture 
small open economy features contemporaneously. 
   
[  
    
 △ 𝑦𝑡𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑠△ 𝑜𝑡𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑑△ 𝑦𝑡𝑑𝜋𝑡𝑑△ 𝜅𝑡 ]  
    
 
= 𝐴1
[  
   
  △ 𝑦𝑡−1𝑤𝑖𝑡−1𝑢𝑠△ 𝑜𝑡−1𝑝𝑖𝑡−1𝑑△ 𝑦𝑡−1𝑑𝜋𝑡−1𝑑△ 𝜅𝑡−1]  
   
  + 𝐴2
[  
   
  △ 𝑦𝑡−2𝑤𝑖𝑡−2𝑢𝑠△ 𝑜𝑡−2𝑝𝑖𝑡−2𝑑△ 𝑦𝑡−2𝑑𝜋𝑡−2𝑑△ 𝜅𝑡−2]  
   
  + 𝐵0−1
[   
    
  𝜖𝑡△𝑦𝑤𝜖𝑡𝑖𝑢𝑠𝜖𝑡△𝑜𝑝𝜖𝑡𝑖𝑑𝜖𝑡△𝑦𝑑𝜖𝑡𝜋𝑑𝜖𝑡△𝜅 ]  
    
   
                                              (4) 
Sign restrictions are imposed on the shock matrix 𝐵0−1 to identify the model. The selection of model 
variables reflects the tradition in the literature‡ which often accord important roles to global demand, 
US monetary policy stance and commodity prices in shaping macroeconomic trends in commodity-
endowed small open economies. Fluctuations in inflation, output, interest rate and terms-of-trade 
dynamics are often used to approximate the business cycle process. 
     𝑓𝑡 = [△ 𝑦𝑡𝑤 𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑠 △ 𝑜𝑡𝑝]′          (5) 
     𝑑𝑡 = [𝑖𝑡𝑑 △ 𝑦𝑡𝑑 𝜋𝑡𝑑 △ 𝜅𝑡]′          
(6)     
The foreign block 𝑓𝑡 includes the global output growth △ 𝑦𝑡𝑤 (GOG), the US federal funds rate 𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑠 
(FFR) and oil price growth △ 𝑜𝑡𝑝 (OPG); while the domestic block 𝑑𝑡 includes the domestic interest 
rate 𝑖𝑡𝑑 (DIR), domestic output growth △ 𝑦𝑡𝑑 (DOG), domestic inflation rate 𝜋𝑡𝑑  (INF) and changes in 
the terms-of-trade △ 𝜅𝑡 (TOT). Foreign shocks in 𝜖𝑡𝑓 are assumed to affect variables in both 𝑓𝑡 and 𝑑𝑡; 
and 𝑓𝑡   variables are determined by their own lags and foreign shocks; while  𝜖𝑡𝑑  shocks are not 
activated. With reference to Nigeria, oil price shock is largely exogenous, given that factors 
determining the evolution of crude oil price are predominantly international. The US monetary policy 
innovations have effects on the Nigerian financial market due to globalization and capital flow 
dynamics. In the same vein, the state of the global economy can influence Nigeria’s economy given 
her status as a notable exporter of crude oil. The vector of foreign shocks impacting the Nigerian 
economy is shown as follows: 
    𝜖𝑡𝑓 = [𝜖𝑡△𝑦𝑤 𝜖𝑡𝑖𝑢𝑠 𝜖𝑡△𝑜𝑝]′     (7) 
where 𝜖𝑡△𝑦𝑤 is the global demand shock (GDS), which represents any surprise event that increases 
world output growth; 𝜖𝑡𝑖𝑢𝑠 is the US monetary policy shock (USMPS), which is an indicator of US 
 
‡ Please see Canova (2005); Jaaskela & Smith (2011) and Silva (2012) 
 10 
contractionary monetary shock while 𝜖𝑡△𝑜𝑝 is the oil price shock (OPS), which is summarised by all 
exogenous events that causes oil price changes in the upward direction. The domestic block of 
structural shocks 𝜖𝑡𝑑: 𝜖𝑡𝑖𝑑 , 𝜖𝑡△𝑦𝑑 , 𝜖𝑡𝜋𝑑 , 𝜖𝑡△𝜅  is muted as it is not identified in our model.  
We identify specific external shocks based on the direct intuitions from three relevant DSGE models, 
developed to capture the peculiar structures of Nigeria and Algeria, both prominent African oil 
exporters. These models include Olayeni (2009b), Adebiyi & Mordi (2012), and Allegret & Benkhodja 
(2015. We assign restrictions as shown in table 2 below. We identified three external shocks, namely: 
global demand shock (𝜖𝑡△𝑦𝑤), US monetary policy shock (𝜖𝑡𝑖𝑢𝑠) and oil price shock (𝜖𝑡△𝑜𝑝). The shocks 
are propagated through both foreign and domestic variables. In the table, a positive sign (+) indicates 
that the response of a variable to a shock is restricted to be positive, whereas, a negative sign (-) means 
that the response of a variable to a shock is set to negative. The symbol (?) indicate no restrictions are 
imposed and that we are agnostic about the sign that a variable will assume in response to a given 
shock. This approach becomes more appealing where the literature is inconclusive on the definite 
pattern of impact between a shock and a variable. The identification scheme is as summarized in table 
2 below.  
Table 2: Identification Scheme  
Shocks/Variables GOG FFR OPG DIR DOG DINF TOT 
GDS  (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) 
USMPS (-) (+) (?) (+) (-) (?) (?) 
OPS (-) (-) (+) (+) (+) (?) (+) 
 
GOG is global output growth; FFR is federal funds rate; OPG is oil price growth, DIR is domestic 
interest rate; DOG is domestic output growth; DINF is domestic inflation and TOT is terms-of-trade. 
GDS is global demand shock; USMPS is US monetary policy shock and OPS is oil price shock. A 
positive global demand shock is assumed to elicit an increase in all global and domestic 
macroeconomic aggregates (Mumtaz & Surico, 2009). Shock to the US monetary policy is expected 
to propel a rise in the US federal funds rate and in the domestic interest rate. An emerging market 
economy typically responds to a US monetary policy shock with an increase in the domestic monetary 
policy rate in favour of international competitiveness required to sustain or attract capital inflows into 
the country. We are however agnostic about how oil price, domestic inflation and terms-of-trade 
responds to a U.S. monetary policy shock. Oil price shock is believed to impact negatively on both 
global output growth and the Federal funds rate. This is in line with Carlstrom & Fuerst (2006), Kilian 
& Lewis (2011) and Inoue & Kilian (2013) who argue that oil price shock causes an increase in the 
price of oil and induces global real activity to fall on impact. 
On the US Fed’s response to an oil price shock, Bernanke et al. (1997) submit that the Fed responds 
to oil price shocks with restrictive monetary policy in order to check inflation. Kilian & Lewis (2011), 
however, questioned this proposition on three main grounds. First, they argue that the Fed cares as 
much about output and employment stabilization as it cares about containing inflation; and that the 
Fed was overly concerned with the output objective during the 1970s. Second, given that the demand 
side of oil price shock transmission channel (which may be further complicated by higher 
precautionary savings) is stronger than the cost-induced supply side channel, an exogenous oil price 
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shock will be recessionary or deflationary and thus, there is no basis to pursue a restrictive monetary 
policy in response to oil price shock. Third, since oil price shocks are the symptoms of a cause, policy 
responses, therefore, should target the underlying demand and supply shocks that drive oil price. The 
effect oil price shock would have on the economy depends on the source of the shock (Kilian, 2008). 
For instance, if an oil price shock is demand driven, it may not result in decline in output after all. The 
argument by Kilian & Lewis (2011) corroborate findings by Hamilton & Herrera (2004), which show 
that Bernanke et al. (1997) conclusion about the Fed’s restrictive monetary policy response to oil price 
shock was mainly influenced by the small lag length applied in their model. Therefore, using a larger 
sample and higher lag length to capture the dynamics in the monthly data, they found that monetary 
policy in the US was indeed loose in response to oil price shocks. 
Based on Allegret & Benkhodja (2015), domestic output growth responds positively to oil price 
shocks. Although, our reference theoretical model suggests a positive inflation response to oil price 
innovations, we chose to remain agnostic about this interaction. Oil price shock and domestic interest 
rate are observed to be positively correlated in keeping with the restrictive monetary policy stance 
targeting inflationary pressures due to oil boom in the economy.  
  
[   
    
  𝑒𝑡△𝑦𝑤𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑡△𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑡△𝑦𝑑𝑒𝑡𝜋𝑑𝑒𝑡△𝜅 ]  
    
   =
[   
   + − − 0 0 0 0+ + − 0 0 0 0+ ? + 0 0 0 0+ + + 0 0 0 0+ − + 0 0 0 0+ ? ? 0 0 0 0+ ? + 0 0 0 0]  
    ∗
[  
    
  𝜖𝑡𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝜖𝑡𝑈𝑆 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝜖𝑡𝑂𝑖𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝜖𝑡𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝜖𝑡𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝜖𝑡𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦𝜖𝑡𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 ]  
    
  
    (12) 
As shown in equation 12, the sub-block of domestic shocks is inactive, indicating that domestic shocks 
are not allowed to impact the system of equations for foreign and domestic variables. Only foreign 
shocks are active, and they impact all the equations or variables in the system. 
4.3 Estimation 
To estimate the specified SVAR model, we apply the Bayesian technique on a seven-variable quarterly 
dataset over the period 1982Q2 - 2016Q1. Our external block variables include global output growth 
rate, US federal funds rate and oil price. These variables are important in our model set up, as they 
summarize the main characteristics of the international business cycle dynamics which have 
implications for both global and domestic economies. The domestic block contains variables capturing 
domestic business cycle fluctuations. They include output growth rate, inflation rate, interest rate and 
terms-of-trade. Data on global output growth and US federal funds rate are from World Bank and the 
Fed data bases, respectively; while terms-of-trade data is from FRED database of St. Louis Federal 
Reserve System, US. The growth rate of domestic output is sourced from the Nigerian National Bureau 
of Statistics (NBS), while oil price series, inflation and 3-month deposit interest rate are sourced from 
the Statistical Bulletin of the Central Bank of Nigeria. All data series are in logarithmic form thus, 
making it possible to compare results associated with different variables more credibly. Diagnostic 
tests performed on the data show that the series do not have unit root, the VAR system is stable and 
the optimal lag length for model estimation is 2 based on four different information criteria. 
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The Bayesian technique is often preferred when the sample is short and the number of variables in the 
VAR system is relatively large. In a large VAR model with small sample, the likelihood function does 
not behave well. Also, there is a problem of over-fitting arising from over-parametrization, which tend 
to undermine the reliability of the estimates. However, in a Bayesian setting, prior information is used 
to compress models with huge coefficients on distant lags or explosive dynamics (Silva, 2012). In line 
with the steps laid out in 3.3, we employ a prior that assumes a Normal-Wishart structure for the 
parameters of the reduced-form to generate a posterior of the same form, based on the identifying 
restrictions. 
5.0 Analysis of Results 
5.1 External Shocks and Domestic Business Cycle - Baseline Model 
Each of the shocks elicit a set of impulse responses contained within the dotted lines which indicates 
the upper and lower bands of the identified set, while the solid line is the median impulse response for 
each set. In the baseline model, we conducted estimation using the full sample data covering the period 
1982Q2 - 2016Q1. The data range include both pre- and post-financial crisis period. 
5.1.1 Global Demand Shock  
The effects of external shocks on the movement of key domestic business cycle variables can be 
inferred from their dynamic responses to foreign innovations. As shown in figure 4, a unit shock to the 
global demand resulted in significant increase in the global output growth and the tightening of the US 
monetary policy. The stance of the US monetary policy tended to mirror the global momentum of 
growth as both increased slightly from the initial response and eventually returned to steady state after 
the twentieth quarter. The result suggests that the Fed considers the performance of the global economy 
in its monetary policy decisions. Similarly, the global demand shock elicits a sharp increase in the oil 
price growth and a milder increase in the terms-of-trade. However, these responses were short-lived 
as oil price growth and changes in terms-of-trade waned barely after the second quarter and became 
fully dissipated by the seventh quarter. 
 
Figure 4: Impulse Responses to the Global Demand Shock 
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The result reflects the volatile nature of the oil price and the associated revenue vulnerability for an oil 
exporter. The global demand shock is associated with a marked response from domestic output growth. 
This is the largest output growth response to any shock in our model.  In the same vein, the response 
of domestic inflation to global demand shock is revealed to be remarkably high and volatile. The 
response of domestic interest rate was initially aggressive but became subsequently moderated and 
persistent until the twenty fifth quarter.  
5.1.2 US Monetary Policy Shock  
The dampening effect of US monetary policy shock on the global output growth is somewhat 
significant on impact. As seen in figure 5, the decline in the global output growth is most intense in 
the fourth quarter before returning to steady state in the fifteenth quarter. This response underscores 
the global counter-cyclical implication of tightening of monetary policy in the US, in order to reign in 
on the inflationary pressures associated with increased worldwide economic momentum. Given that 
we are agnostic about the response of oil price to a US monetary policy shock, the response is found 
to be positive and significant but unsteady as it jumped to negative territory in the third quarter and 
rebounded in the sixth quarter before returning to steady state in the eighth quarter. This oil price 
developments indicate the uncertainty surrounding the duration of the effect of the US monetary policy 
surprises on oil price growth. On impact, the US monetary policy shock had no effect on the terms-of-
trade. The subdued impact became manifest and peaked near zero in the third quarter and then 
gradually returned to steady state in the eight quarter. The positive response of domestic inflation to 
the US monetary policy shock happens after a quarter delay. It peaks moderately in the fifth quarter 
before dissipating eventually in the thirteenth quarter. 
 
Figure 5: Impulse Responses to the US Monetary Policy Shock 
A US monetary policy shock is a trigger for capital outflow from Nigeria. Substantial capital outflow 
in response to higher interest rate structure in the US can precipitate inflationary pressure in Nigeria 
via the exchange rate channel. The delay period in inflation’s response to a US monetary policy shock 
may be attributable to investors possible cautious attitude or their inability to liquidate their current 
holdings of domestic financial assets immediately, owing to possible restrictions and maturities. 
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Domestic interest rate responded quite positively to the tightening of monetary policy in the US. This 
is a plausible response in order to retain and attract capital flows while also stemming inflationary 
pressures. 
5.1.3 Oil Price Shock 
A major external shock that affect the world economy and particularly the oil-exporting small open 
economies is oil price shock. Impulse response functions as shown in figure 3 indicate that a unit shock 
to oil price growth elicit considerable decline in global output growth. Similarly, the response of the 
US monetary policy to a unit shock to oil price is rather aggressive and persistent. This is because, 
while global output growth declined by about 0.08 percent before reverting to steady state in the 
thirteenth quarter, the US monetary policy was eased by nearly 0.125 percent to accommodate the oil 
shock and it did not revert to steady state until around the twentieth quarter. This result suggests that 
the US Fed tends to respond dovishly and for a long time to developments in the global oil price. Oil 
price response to its own shock is sharp but short-lived, while terms-of-trade response to oil price 
growth shock is positive, substantial and short-lived; in the manner of oil price response to its own 
shock. It seems evident from this dynamic response, that there is no guarantee that a positive oil price 
response to an oil shock can be sustained beyond three quarters as shown in figure 6. 
 
Figure 6: Impulse Responses to Oil Price Shock 
Domestic output growth, a major business cycle variable, shows a mild but positive response to oil 
price growth shock and the response persisted for nearly ten quarters. The sluggish and unsteady 
positive response of domestic inflation to oil price shock grew to about 2 percent by the tenth quarter 
before finally dissipating after quarter 20. The benign response of inflation to oil price shock may be 
attributed to the central bank’s active monetary policy action to keep inflation within an implicit target, 
as can be observed from the sharp response of domestic interest rate to the oil price shock. Oil price 
shock also elicits a 0.75 percent tightening of the domestic monetary policy. Given oil price 
innovations, it is common for oil-exporting SOE central banks to tighten policy stance in order to 
contain inflation and ensure positive real interest rate. 
5.2 External Shocks and Domestic Business Cycle: A Robustness Analysis 
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Given the impacts of the recent global financial crisis on small open economies, we conduct a simple 
robustness exercise by re-estimating the model for the pre-GFC period 1982Q2 - 2007Q4 and 
comparing the impulse responses. 
5.2.1 Global Demand Shock 
The response of domestic output to the global demand shock in the two estimations are comparable in 
terms of magnitude but less persistent in the pre-GFC sample. The impulse generates about 0.5 percent 
responses under both estimations, but the effect lingered for longer in the full sample estimation. This 
suggests that the GFC may have contributed to the amplification of the persistence of the effect of the 
global demand shock in Nigeria. In addition, response pattern of interest rate following a global 
demand shock are similar under both estimations, indicating that there was no significant change in 
CBN’s strategy for responding to global demand shocks pre and post the GFC. Overall, given that the 
global demand shock causes comparable magnitude of responses in domestic output growth and 
interest rate pre and post GFC, it can be inferred that macroeconomic risk associated with a negative 
demand shock are systematic or undiversifiable in nature. 
 
Figure 7: Impulse Responses to the Global Demand Shock (Pre-GFC) 
Unlike the pronounced inflation volatility associated with the full sample estimation results, inflation 
volatility moderates in the current estimation results; suggesting that the global financial crisis 
contributes to higher inflationary response to global demand shock. 
5.2.2 US Monetary Policy Shock 
The domestic output growth shrank mildly and then returned to steady state in the eight quarter in 
response to a unit shock to the US monetary policy. On impact, the shock caused a temporary fall in 
inflation, but by the third quarter, inflation had risen significantly and remained persistent till the 
twenty fifth quarter. Domestic interest rate’s response to a US monetary policy shock is positive and 
similar in magnitude to that under the baseline estimation but different in terms of persistence level. 
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Figure 8: Impulse Responses to US Monetary Policy Shock (Pre-GFC) 
The effect of the shock on domestic interest rate persists in the current estimation until the twentieth 
quarter compared to the previous estimation which dissipated quicker in the tenth quarter. The response 
of the terms-of-trade to the shock is positive but subdued and died out in the tenth quarter. 
5.2.3 Oil Price Shock  
The effect of oil price shock on domestic variables is similar under both the full sample and sub-sample 
estimations, although with varying degrees of persistence. Whereas, the impact of the shock is more 
persistent on domestic output growth and inflation pre-crisis, the domestic interest rate response to oil 
price shock is more persistent in the model with the full sample. Intensity and persistence of oil price 
shock are essentially the same under both estimation samples for oil price and terms-of-trade. 
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Figure 9: Impulse Responses to an Oil Price Shock (Pre-GFC) 
As shown in figure 9, domestic inflation, following an agnostic identification, exhibit a temporary 
negative response on impact before reversing to positive territory in the third quarter. This initial 
negative inflation response to oil price shock is at variance with the small, volatile but positive response 
inflation exhibited in the full sample estimation. From this result, it may be inferred that in a crisis-
free world, oil price shock pass-through to lower inflation may be more pronounced in Nigeria. 
5.3 Historical Decomposition of External Shocks 
Figures 10, 11, 12 and 13 reveal, respectively, the contributions of the three identified external shocks 
to the Nigerian business cycle fluctuations via the domestic output growth, the domestic inflation, the 
terms-of-trade and the domestic interest rate for the period 1982Q2 - 2016Q1. The historical 
contributions of the decomposed shocks are displayed in the upper panels of each figure, while a trend 
chart of the underlining domestic variables that these shocks drive are plotted in the lower panels of 
the referenced figures. 
 
Figure 10: Historical Decomposition of Domestic Output Growth and it’s trend 
The decomposition of external shocks in figure 7 shows that oil price and global demand shocks have 
comparable contributions to the domestic output growth movement in Nigeria. Positive oil price 
shocks are associated with high domestic output growth while negative oil price shocks are shown to 
correspond with moments of low, no and negative output growth. For instance, oil price shocks 
induced by the 1990 Gulf war and the 2011 terrorist attack in the US, respectively, resulted in higher 
output growth, while the negative oil price shocks between 2014Q1 - 2016Q1 are associated with 
deceleration in domestic output growth. This evidences Nigeria’s high dependency on oil and exposure 
to vulnerability arising from oil price volatility. 
The global demand shock and the Nigerian business cycle appear to co-move, indicating that the 
country has its shares of the gains and pains of global economic growth and deceleration, respectively. 
Although, the impact of the US monetary policy shock on Nigeria’s domestic output growth appear 
notable but is not as pronounced as the global demand and oil price shocks. 
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From figure 10, we observe that, for the most parts of the sample, whenever both oil price and the US 
interest rate shocks are positive, domestic output growth tends to gain momentum; while an episode 
of high global demand and high interest rate does not seem to provide any significant impetus for 
domestic economic growth. Our results also indicate that during the Gulf War of 1990, the 
simultaneous positive global demand and oil price shocks, together with a negative US interest rate 
shock contributes to higher domestic economic growth. 
 
Figure 11: Historical Decomposition of Domestic Inflation and it’s trend 
Figure 11 also reveals oil price shock as the key contributor to inflation dynamics in Nigeria. Between 
1982 and 1999 when inflation volatility was most pronounced, oil price shocks is shown to co-move 
with domestic inflation trend. This persisted throughout the remaining parts of the sample, albeit, in a 
relatively low and stable inflation environment. A departure from this trend, however, ensued in 
2015Q4, where negative oil price shock seems to drive inflation upward, mainly due to the foreign 
exchange crisis following the massive decline in oil earnings. 
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Figure 12: Historical Decomposition of Terms-of-trade and it’s trend 
In the decomposition of the shocks driving terms-of-trade as shown in figure 12, oil price and global 
demand shocks appear to be the leading contributors. The terms-of-trade is a mirror image of the oil 
price, as oil exports constitute the lion share of Nigeria’s trade with the rest of the world. To reduce 
the influence of the oil component in the terms-of-trade, the non-oil component of the terms-of-trade 
must increase significantly. 
The results in figure 10 reveal that the Central Bank of Nigeria, in setting the interest rate, tends to pay 
attention to oil price movement, as episodes of positive oil price shocks are associated with tight 
monetary policy. Higher oil price and earnings provides impetus for increased government expenditure 
and raises the concern about inflation. 
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Figure 13: Historical Decomposition of Domestic Interest Rate and it’s trend 
At such times, the banking system experiences excess money supply, which tends to encourage 
increased demand for imports leading to foreign exchange market pressure. This causes an interest rate 
hike by the central bank in order to contain inflation. 
6.0 Summary, Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 
We employ a sign-restricted structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) model to examine the role of 
external shocks in the evolution of business cycle in Nigeria. Our identification structure reflects 
findings by Mumtaz & Surico (2009), Kilian & Lewis (2011), Olayeni (2009b) and Allegret & 
Benkhodja (2015). Three external shocks were identified in a seven variable SVAR model.  
Our results indicate that global demand and oil price shocks dominate as drivers of the Nigerian 
business cycle. Particularly, the effect of the global demand shock on important business cycle 
variables is revealed to be most fundamental. Global demand shock is most profound on domestic 
output and inflation while oil price shock exerts the most influence on domestic interest rate and the 
terms-of-trade. Our robustness exercise indicates that the macroeconomic risk associated with global 
demand shock is systematic, given that its impact remains visible with or without taking the GFC into 
consideration. Inflation in Nigeria is most sensitive to global demand shock, but most driven 
historically by oil price shock. The GFC is shown to have amplified the sensitivity of domestic inflation 
to the global demand shock, thus, resulting to higher inflation volatility.  
The central bank, beyond the considerations for oil, should pay greater attention to global demand 
dynamics, in order to respond more strategically to contain inflation volatility arising from global 
demand shocks. This is particularly crucial, as our findings suggest that monetary policy response to 
the global demand shock was essentially the same before and during the crisis. In addition, given the 
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strong and pervasive impact of the global demand shock on domestic output growth in Nigeria, 
appropriate policy measures are required to ensure the gains of positive global demand shocks are 
maximised and dynamic responses to minimise the adverse effects of negative global demand shocks 
on the economy. To address oil-exporting SOEs vulnerability to oil shocks, the fraction of crude oil 
exports in their terms-of-trade must decrease while that of the non-oil exports must improve 
progressively through sustained economic diversification and industrialisation strategy.    
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